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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership.

F. The Study and the Sample

The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the biographical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces.

To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen-

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that one unpublicized aspect of this new line may be a slowing down of the program of military preparation in the satellites and a re-evaluation of their military potential. Both the open outbreak of satellite discontent and the Politburo's desire to stress temporary economic concessions might lead to such changes in military policy.

For all these reasons we may guess that the picture to be drawn in this study, based as it is upon 1951 data, represents the Soviet plans for the satellite armies at the end of the Stalin era, but not in all respects the way in which things are actually working out at the present moment. We do not know how present actualities diverge from the plans nor what recent changes have been made in the plans. However great these divergences and changes may be, it still remains useful to see how the Politburo conceived the prospects of satellite military development just before the traumatic event of Stalin's death. Whatever corrections future developments will force us to make in our prognoses, one useful piece of data will be the intentions with which the Russians started. It is to ascertain these that our data is relevant.

G. The Method

The methods used in this study are more fully described in the general introduction to the Hoover Institute Elite Series, The Comparative Study of Elites, An Introduction and Bibliography, by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell. We record for each individual in our sample certain standardized biographical facts such as the date of his birth, date of death, cause of death, jobs held, place of origin, occupation of father, schools attended, associations joined, foreign travel, awards and decorations, publications, etc. A list of fifty characteristics for which we look when they are available is presented on pages 26-27 of the above mentioned volume. For general officers, among the most important special characteristics on which we sought data were their military training, their nonmilitary education, their branch of service, their combat record, the extent to which they held nonmilitary jobs, the extent to which they participated in politics, their record of promotions, etc.

The data on any individual is recorded on a punch card and tabulations are then made of the incidence of the coded characteristics in different armies or different parts of the same army.

H. The Problem of Sources

It is difficult to obtain biographical information on officers, particularly on those from totalitarian countries. We started this project with an experimental attitude and with the hope, but no conviction, that the desired information might be obtained. On the whole

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we are more than satisfied with this aspect of our endeavor. The most fruitful single source consisted of Who's Who's and similar biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs, obituaries, and articles about prominent figures which appear from time to time even in totalitarian countries. We also relied to some extent on informants who had had firsthand contact with the armies in question. They were often able to provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in brief printed sources.

Unfortunately the sources are not consistent in their accuracy or criteria of reporting. For one country we may have very adequate information on education but not on parental occupation. For another country it may be the other way around. There is also the possibility and indeed likelihood of falsification in some of the biographical reports. The Communists often present fanciful biographies. They tend, for example, to play up or invent humble backgrounds. They also tend to emphasize the native satellite origins and experiences of officers whose real life histories may involve prolonged residence in Russia while refugee sources emphasize the foreign origins of Communist officials. Thus two quite different biographies of Marshal Rokossovski have been published.

Having expressed these warnings about the reliability of some of the sources, it would be a mistake to regard them as invalidating the data. While the data undoubtedly contain a wider margin of errors than is customary in domestic social science studies, they are far more precise and reliable than mere subjective untested impressions. Our goal was to get better information than heretofore available, not to get perfect information. What we report here is the result of as careful a process of checking and evaluation as we were able to make. We feel that there are some trends which it reveals of which there need be little doubt even though individual errors have crept into the data.

1. Introduction to the Case Studies

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In this introductory chapter we have talked of the European satellites as if they were more or less the same. In the subsequent chapters we shall examine them one by one. In so doing we shall note differences in the problems faced and solutions taken, differences which we have so far neglected. We have been able to discuss the East European satellites as a unit since they follow a common set of Russian-originated patterns. We have examined above the sequence of parallel policy changes from one of coalition to one of consolidation to one of training and development which seem to indicate a common set of Soviet directives. We have also noted the adherence to Russian practices in equipment, uniforms, training, and regulations.

The end result was an organizational structure for the satellite